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Post-Darwin skepticism and run-of-the-mill suicide
Commentary on Peña-Guzmán on Animal Suicide
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Abstract: Peña-Guzmán’s depiction of the opponent of animal suicide as a conservative is a
straw man. It is possible to accept that animals are self-conscious and reflexive yet still reject
the view that they have the mental wherewithal to commit run-of-the-mill suicide. That animal
behaviour can be positioned on a continuum of self-destructive behaviour does not establish
that animals can intentionally kill themselves.
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Peña-Guzmán (2017) misrepresents the position of the skeptic. One need not believe that reflexivity is an all-or-nothing capacity, nor that reflexivity maps neatly onto species classification, in order to reject the view that nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) can commit suicide. Instead, the skeptic can coherently hold that reflexivity admits of degrees and that some
humans, such as newborn infants and people with severe cognitive impairment, may lack reflexivity. In other words, a skeptic can hold that animals are subjectively reflexive but nonetheless still lack the requisite mental wherewithal to satisfy the conditions for run-of-the-mill
suicide.1 Believing as much does not make one a speciesist, a Cartesian or an anthropocentric
conservative.
I say “run-of-the-mill” suicide because, as Peña-Guzmán intimates (p. 2), suicide is a
complex phenomenon and care needs to be taken to distinguish actions that may directly or
indirectly diminish well-being from the act of intentionally taking one’s life. A living being does
not have to be all that psychologically complex in order to behave in ways that we may judge
as detrimental to well-being. Think of infants who will put anything and everything into their
mouths. I presuppose that to take one’s life, in the relevant sense for a discussion of animal
suicide, is for an individual to do so under conditions of anguish — after making a judgment
that one’s life is not worth living.2 It is the wherewithal for making such a judgment, in the
absence of compelling empirical evidence to the contrary (Preti 2007), that it is reasonable to
believe animals lack.

1

I borrow the expression “run-of-the-mill” suicide from Cholbi (2017).
While suicide bombers and kamikaze pilots knowingly lose their lives, they do not take their own lives in the
relevant sense because their actions are not attendant upon a judgment that life is not worth living. For the
purposes of this paper, suicide bombers and kamikaze pilots are not run-of-the-mill cases.
2
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To be able to judge that life is not worth living requires more than self-conscious reflexivity but the possession of mental states with specific content, and the capacity for making
comparative judgments about life and its prospects. After all, self-conscious reflexivity may
entail only bodily awareness, as opposed to awareness of oneself as a subject of continuing
experiences (DeGrazia 2009, p. 201), or just the ability to read the mind of conspecifics (Hare,
et al. 2000). Nothing about the ability to judge one’s future prospects under conditions of
anguish can be read off either capacity. Of course, reflective judgments do not have to take
the form of sentence-like structures (Rescorla 2009), but they presumably do need to have
content (Carruthers 2000; Fodor 1974; Stich 1979).3 The proponent of animal suicide needs to
give evidence that animals have mental states with the requisite content. Peña-Guzmán gives
reasonable grounds for thinking that animals have the concept of death (pp. 6-7). He wants us
to go on to accept that the remaining mental wherewithal can be inferred from evidence that
animals experience negative emotions, engage in self-injurious and self-destructive behaviours, and (for some species such as dolphins and primates) pass mirror recognition tests. One
can accept all of these facts yet still not be convinced that animals have what it takes to intentionally kill themselves after judging that their lives are not worth living.
Peña-Guzmán may argue that it was never his intention to suggest that animals can
commit run-of-the-mill suicide and that all he was seeking to do was to make the case for
thinking that “self-destructive and self-injurious behaviour among human and nonhuman animals vary on a continuum” (p. 1). But if that is the case, then his project would lack serious
philosophical interest. Since Darwin, it can be accepted as a trivial truth that the psychology
of humans and animals is different only by degree and not kind. What the post-Darwin skeptic
wants to see is grounds for thinking that certain animal behaviours warrant a place on the
continuum beyond the threshold marking behaviour that leads to the act of taking one’s life.
Consider an analogy with moral responsibility. Children, adolescents and dementia patients
are all capable of performing the kinds of actions that ordinarily only persons are held responsible for; punching, biting, being rude and obnoxious, etcetera.4 Nevertheless, being able to
perform such actions is arguably sufficient for placing children, adolescents and dementia patients on the moral responsibility continuum. But, that children, adolescents and dementia
patients warrant a place on the continuum because they can perform actions that ordinarily
only persons are held responsible for, does not tell us whether they should be counted among
the genuinely morally responsible. What we require is grounds for thinking that this or that
individual has the requisite mental states to be held accountable for their actions. Likewise,
with any suicide continuum: that animals may occupy a place on it does not establish that they
can commit run-of-the-mill suicide.

3

For simplicity, I leave aside the issue of whether the mental states must be explicable in terms of beliefs and
desires, and the related question of whether the content is conceptual or nonconceptual.
4
By “person” I mean so-called mentally competent adults and, in some circumstances, young people who may
be sufficiently informed in virtue of possessing the relevant concepts. Logically, as recent attempts to establish
legal standing for great apes and cetaceans attest (Wise 2002), the class of persons need not be restricted to a
sub-set of the species Homo sapiens.
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